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Abstract  
Epistemic duties would be duties to believe, disbelieve, or withhold judgment 
propositions, and they would be grounded in purely evidential considerations. I offer a 
new argument for the claim that there are no epistemic duties. Though people may have 
duties to believe, disbelieve, or withhold judgment from propositions, those duties are 
never grounded in purely epistemic considerations. Rather, allegedly epistemic duties 
are a species of moral duty.  
1 Introduction  
A person can be morally, legally, or prudentially obligated to do something. There are 
even cases in which a person might be morally, legally, or prudentially obligated to 
believe something. Maybe I cannot act rightly without believing in the fundamentally 
equal moral value of all persons, or maybe the law says I must know the expiration dates 
on the milk I sell, or maybe it is in my best interest to believe my doctors are competent. 
Such cases respectively impose moral, legal, and prudential obligations to have certain 
beliefs.  
Can a person be epistemically obligated to believe, disbelieve, or withhold judgment 
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about something? An affirmative answer means that there are purely epistemic sources of 
duty, over and above such other sources as morality, prudence, and law. Usually, those 
who believe in epistemic duties see them as grounded in the evidence available to a 
person. I see, hear, and feel the falling rain. Because I have such excellent evidence it is 
raining, and I lack weightier evidence to the contrary, I epistemically ought to believe it is 
raining. To believe it is raining is my epistemic duty.  
Putative epistemic duties might conflict with other duties. Suppose the law requires 
me to have true beliefs about when the milk I sell expires. Without my knowledge, 
pranksters have labeled the milk with the wrong dates. Consequently, I have excellent 
evidence my milk expires ten days from now, when in fact it expires in a week. My legal 
duty is to believe the milk expires in a week. My epistemic duty is to believe it expires in 
ten days. I cannot do both.  
The idea of epistemic duty could be very useful. In particular, it might help us to 
understand in what sense a belief must be “justified” to count as knowledge. We often 
understand the notion of moral justification, for example, in terms of conformity to moral 
duty. It is thus natural to understand the epistemic justification necessary for knowledge 
in terms of conformity to epistemic duty (Alston 1988, p. 257).
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Nevertheless, some philosophers deny there can be any such thing as an epistemic 
duty. Ordinarily, their argument runs something like this: If it is truly one’s duty to X, 
one must have voluntary control over whether or not one X-es. People do not have 
voluntary control over whether or not they believe something. Therefore, it is never one’s 
duty (not) to believe something. Epistemic duties pertain to what one believes, and so 
there are no epistemic duties (Alston 1985, 1988; Plantinga 1988).  
Responses to this standard line of argument have been predictable. Some have argued 
that epistemic duties are of a sort that does not require voluntary control (Feldman 1988, 
2000, 2001). Others have argued that we do have the kind of control over our beliefs that 
epistemic duty would require (Chisholm 1991; Heil 1983; Heller 2000; Russell 2001; 
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Steup 2000).  
I do not have settled opinions about free will, voluntary control, or their relationships 
to what kinds of duties there are. Therefore, I do not have a settled opinion about whether 
the standard objection to epistemic duty succeeds. In this paper, I offer a new line of 
argument for the claim that there are no epistemic duties.  
The argument, in rough outline, is as follows: All the supposedly epistemic duties a 
situation imposes on one coincide with moral duties that situation also imposes. Thus 
there is no need to posit a category of epistemic duty over and above moral duty. 
Supposed epistemic duties are really just moral duties in disguise.  
I try to make as much sense as I can of the idea of epistemic duty in Section 2. In 
Sections 3 and 4, I set out my argument against epistemic duties more carefully. I answer 
some likely objections in Section 5. 
2 Epistemic Duty  
The basic idea of epistemic duty is straightforward. Let us use ‘doxastic attitude’ as a 
general term for the family of states typified by belief, disbelief and withholding 
judgment, and let us call any duty to have a certain doxastic attitude a “doxastic duty.” 
Epistemic duties are doxastic duties that are grounded in purely epistemic considerations, 
such as what evidence one has.  
Epistemic duties are not the only doxastic duties. As the examples mentioned earlier 
indicate, there are also moral, legal, and prudential doxastic duties. Each of these kinds of 
duty is distinguished by its source. Moral duties arise from moral considerations, legal 
duties from the law, and prudential duties from what is in one’s interest.  
It is not especially enlightening to say that epistemic duties are doxastic duties that 
arise from purely epistemic considerations. We still need to demarcate the purely 
epistemic considerations in some way. Roderick Chisholm attempts to do just that in his 
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account of epistemic requirement. On Chisholm’s account, a state of affairs epistemically 
requires a doxastic attitude if and only if (i) it requires that attitude and (ii) everything it 
requires is either (a) a doxastic attitude or (b) something required trivially by all states of 
affairs that require anything at all (Chisholm 1991, p. 124).
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Chisholm distinguishes requirements from duties. Duties, for Chisholm, are 
requirements that are not overridden by more comprehensive considerations. An 
epistemic duty is an epistemic requirement not overridden by the epistemic requirements 
of more inclusive states of affairs (Chisholm 1991, p. 124). This distinction between 
requirement and duty, and thus the distinction between Chisholmian epistemic 
requirement and Chisholmian epistemic duty, will not matter to the points I make below.  
Chisholm’s aim is only to make sense of what a purely epistemic source of duty 
would be. He does not mean his account to address the standard objection that there can 
be no epistemic duties because we do not have voluntary control over our doxastic 
attitudes. Richard Feldman, however, has tried to develop an account of epistemic duty 
that avoids the standard objection (Feldman 1988, 2000, 2001).  
For Feldman, epistemic duties are the duties we have in virtue of occupying a certain 
role, the role of being a believer. They are things one ought to do in order to do the job of 
being a believer correctly, and that amounts to believing in accord with one’s evidence 
(Feldman 2000, p. 676; 2001, pp. 878).  
On Feldman’s account, epistemic duties are “role obligations,” a type of obligation he 
contrasts with “responsibility obligations.”
3 
A responsibility obligation is something one 
ought to do, such that one would be blameworthy for failing to do it (Feldman 2001, p. 
87). Because one can be blameworthy only for what is within one’s voluntary control, 
says Feldman, one cannot have a responsibility obligation to do something that is beyond 
one’s voluntary control. On his view, there are no epistemic responsibility obligations.  
Role obligations are obligations “that result from one’s playing a certain role or 
having a certain position” (Feldman 2001, p. 87). Examples Feldman gives include the 
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obligations of parents to care for their children, of teachers to explain things clearly, and 
of cyclists to move in certain ways. Unlike responsibility obligations, role obligations do 
not presuppose voluntary control. A teacher might be unable to explain things clearly, a 
parent might be unable to take care of her children, or a cyclist might be unable to move 
in the right ways. The fact that one is unable to discharge a role obligation, however, does 
not make the obligation itself disappear. Rather, it only makes one a bad occupant of the 
role in question—a bad parent, teacher, or cyclist, for example (Feldman 2001, pp. 87–8).  
Feldman’s proposal, then, is just that epistemic duties are role obligations. Even if we 
lack voluntary control over our doxastic attitudes, there are certain things we ought to do 
in order correctly to fulfill the role of being a believer. “Forming beliefs,” he writes  
is something that people do. That is, we form beliefs in response to our 
experiences in the world. Anyone engaged in this activity ought to do it right. 
In my view, what they ought to do is to follow their evidence (rather than 
their wishes or fears). I suggest that epistemic oughts are of this sort—they 
describe the right way to play a certain role. . . . They are based on what’s 
good performance. (Feldman 2001, p. 88)  
For Feldman, then, we all occupy the role of being a believer, and we can discharge that 
role either correctly or incorrectly. Our epistemic duties are what we must do to discharge 
it correctly, even if we lack voluntary control over what we believe. I may, for example, 
be unable to apply modus tollens properly most of the time. Nevertheless, to do the job of 
being a believer right, I ought to believe that Not-p when I believe both that Not-q and 
that q if p.  
Neither Chisholm’s account nor Feldman’s is fully satisfying. Chisholm’s account 
may be extensionally adequate, but it does not explain very much. It does not tell us how 
epistemic duties arise or why some states of affairs nontrivially require doxastic states 
and only doxastic states. The account sheds little light on the nature of epistemic duty.  
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Feldman’s account avoids that problem. It explains the nature of epistemic duty by 
appeal to what constitutes good performance as a believer. But Feldman’s account has 
problems of its own. If epistemic duties are what one must do to do the job of being a 
believer correctly, then we need an account of doing well as a believer that does not rely 
on the prior notion of epistemic duty. It would be circular to characterize epistemic duty 
as Feldman does and then to explain doing well as a believer as doing one’s epistemic 
duty. Nor is Feldman’s appeal to the notion of evidence much help here. Not all 
information is evidence, and the most obvious way to distinguish what is evidence from 
what is not is to note that evidence is information that imposes epistemic duties.
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Despite their problems, Chisholm and Feldman’s accounts give a good sense of the 
general idea of epistemic duty. If they are right in spirit, at least, then there are two ways 
in which one might argue against the existence of epistemic duties.  
The first way is to argue that there are no doxastic duties, and thus no epistemic duties 
either. This, I think, is the strategy of the standard objection from doxastic involuntarism. 
That objection concludes that we do not have doxastic duties from the claims that (a) we 
do not have duties to do what is beyond our voluntary control and (b) we do not have 
voluntary control over our doxastic attitudes.  
The second, more neglected, way to deny there are epistemic duties is to deny any 
duties are grounded in purely epistemic considerations. For example, one might argue 
that the state of having certain evidence is just the wrong sort of thing to impose a duty. 
Or one might argue that no states of affairs nontrivially require doxastic attitudes and 
only doxastic attitudes. Or one might argue that there are no obligations attached to the 
role of “being a believer.”  
I pursue a version of the second strategy in this paper. In my view, there are no duties 
with purely epistemic grounds. There is a general method we can use for showing that a 
putative source of duty really does not impose duties after all. I describe that method in 
the following section, and I apply it the special case of epistemic duty in Section 4. The 
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upshot will be that what might have looked like epistemic duties are really just moral 
duties to do cognitive things, or else they are not duties at all. 
3 Arguing Against Sources of Duty  
Imagine someone proposes a category of “parental duties,” which are supposed to be 
duties of parents qua parents, independently of any other possible sources of obligation 
such as morality, the law, prudence, and so on. In general, parental duties involve doing 
what is in the best interests of one’s children. For example, if medical care is in the best 
interest of one’s child, it might be one’s parental duty to see to that the child receives 
medical care. How might we argue that there are no parental duties?  
Let us first be clear what it is to deny there are parental duties. It is not to deny that 
parents have special obligations pertaining to the welfare of their children. Rather, it is to 
deny that those obligations are non-moral obligations deriving from the biological fact of 
parenthood. We thus could argue against their existence by arguing that all putatively 
parental duties are really moral duties to do parental things.  
Such an argument can be very straightforward. It is true that parents ought to do 
things that are in the best interests of their children, but the relevant sense of ‘ought’ is 
moral. It is the moral duty of parents to promote their children’s interests. If one’s child 
needs medical care and one does not see to it that she gets it, one is guilty of a moral 
failing (provided, of course, that further moral considerations do not override the duty in 
one’s particular case).  
There is just no point in positing parental duties over and above moral duties. Positing 
them will lead us to attribute no new obligations—and no new sources of obligation—to 
people. Whenever a set of circumstances is supposed to obligate a person to do 
something parentally, those very same circumstances also morally require her to do that 
very thing. We can get all the same work done by sticking with morality alone, without 
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supposing any duties are purely parental.  
We have a choice, then, between two attitudes about the existence of parental duties. 
We could hold that there are such duties, even though including them in our catalog of 
duties adds nothing to our understanding of the world. Or we could deny that they exist, 
explain them away by appeal to moral duties to do parental things, and thereby eliminate 
an unnecessary complication to our conceptual system. Theoretical economy favors the 
latter attitude. So long as there is no good reason to posit sui generis parental duties, it 
seems best to deny there are any.  
Of course, one could maintain that parental duties do exist, but they are a species of 
moral duty. In particular, they might consist of those moral duties that derive from the 
facts about what is in the interests of one’s children. Such a move would be perfectly 
reasonable, but it would abandon the original idea of parental duties set out above. That 
was the idea of duties of parents qua parents independently of their moral and other 
duties. If one grants that parental duties are a kind of moral duty, one has given up the 
claim that there is an autonomous realm of parental duty.  
The above discussion suggests a general strategy. To argue against the existence of 
duties of kind K, we could argue that all putative K-duties coincide with moral duties. To 
do that, we could show that facts alleged to K-require something are morally significant 
and always morally require the very same thing. In the case of parental duties, that means 
showing that whatever circumstances allegedly impose a parental requirement to do 
something also impose a moral requirement to do that very thing, because parenthood is 
morally significant and entails moral obligations to look out for one’s children’s interests. 
When everything any state of affairs supposedly K-requires is already required morally 
by that very state of affairs, there is no point in positing an independent realm of K-duty. 
Our conceptual system would be more economical if it denied the existence of sui generis 
K-duties and instead treated them as special cases of moral duty. That, I take it, is a 
perfectly legitimate reason to deny that there are K-duties.  
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I do not claim that ‘It serves no purpose to posit K-duties, therefore there are no K-
duties’ is a deductively valid form of inference. Nevertheless, I do think it exemplifies 
one of the most useful and successful forms of inductive inference in the sciences, an 
application of Occam’s Razor. We do not believe in vital forces, for example, because 
positing them would add nothing to our existing, biochemical understanding of the 
processes involved in being alive. We do not believe in vital forces because we do not 
need to believe in them, and they would unnecessarily complicate our conceptual system. 
Once we have seen that the idea of sui generis K-duties adds nothing to our 
understanding of what people ought to do, their status comes to be like that of vital 
forces. We do not need to posit them, and so we might as well just deny that there are 
any. 
4 There are no Epistemic Duties  
We can apply the above pattern of argument to supposedly epistemic duties. Every 
situation that imposes a supposedly epistemic duty, I will argue, morally requires the very 
same thing. Just as there are no parental duties—only moral duties to do parental things, 
there are no epistemic duties—only moral duties to do cognitive things.  
Let us say that a body of evidence “favors” believing a proposition when the 
proposition is objectively much more likely on the evidence than its denial. It favors 
disbelieving the proposition in the converse case, and it favors withholding when it 
neither favors believing nor favors disbelieving. When a person considers a proposition, 
she has a supposedly epistemic duty to have the favored attitude (i.e., the attitude her 
evidence favors). I will argue for the following claim:  
(MD) If a person S considers a proposition p, it is S’s pro tanto moral 
obligation to have the attitude toward p that S’s evidence favors.  
Notice that (MD) does not ascribe an overriding obligation to have the favored 
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attitude. It does not say that one always ought, all things considered, to have whatever 
attitudes one’s evidence favors. (MD) ascribes a pro tanto moral obligation, which might 
be outweighed by competing obligations in certain cases. Thus it is logically weaker than 
Clifford’s similar dictum (Clifford 1876/1999), on its most natural, moral interpretation:  
It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insuf-
ficient evidence.  
(MD) is closer to the claim that it always morally bad to believe on insufficient evidence 
than to the claim that it is always morally wrong.
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Nevertheless, (MD) is strong enough to support the argument against purely 
epistemic duty. If (MD) is true, whenever a person has a supposedly epistemic duty to 
have a given attitude, she also has a moral obligation to have that same attitude (although 
the moral obligation might be overridden in certain cases). Given (MD), there would be 
no point in positing an autonomous realm of epistemic duty.  
The case for (MD) derives from the moral importance of people’s ends and their 
efforts to realize them. Any reasonable moral theory will acknowledge that importance 
and endorse a principle such as this:  
(MP) Whenever a person has a range of mutually incompatible options, she 
has a pro tanto moral obligation to take whatever option is best from the 
standpoint of promoting people’s ends (or one of those options, if there 
is a tie).  
The principle requires some unpacking, but its general idea is that, other things being 
equal, one ought to do whatever is most likely to help people the most. Additional 
considerations can override the pro tanto obligation (MP) describes. Suppose X is the 
option that best promotes people’s ends. It still might be the case that X is wrong in itself, 
that the ends it promotes are evil, or that it would interfere with discharging more 
important moral obligations. In any of those cases, the pro tanto obligation to take X 
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would be overridden.  
To promote an end is to make its realization more likely (or to realize it). The more an 
option raises the likelihood that more ends will be realized, the more effective the option 
is.
6 
I call an option “best” when it is the option that is most objectively likely to be the 
most effective, given the information available to the agent.  
One might suppose that we ought to take the most effective option, rather than the 
best one. To see why this is a mistake, consider the case in which the best option happens 
not to be the most effective. This is one of the rare cases in which the option most likely 
to be most effective is not most effective. Suppose a person in such a situation took the 
most effective option, even though it was not best. She would be subject to criticism. We 
would tell her that things worked out all right this time, but she was lucky. She took an 
unwarranted risk she ought not to have taken. On the other hand, if she had taken the best 
option, she would not be subject to criticism. She did the best she could on the 
information available to her, and she was unlucky. The option one ought to take, then, is 
the best option, even in cases when it is not the most effective.  
Here is an example to illustrate the point. Jack has been kidnapped, and his captors 
have forced him to play a variety of Russian roulette. He must choose between two 
revolvers, each of which holds up to six bullets. Revolver A has a bullet in all chambers 
but chamber 5. Revolver B has a bullet in chamber 5 but not any of the others. Jack can 
see that this is how the revolvers are arranged. One shot will be fired at Jack from 
whichever revolver he chooses. Though Jack has no evidence of it, his captors have 
arranged that chamber 5 will be fired at him, whichever gun he chooses. So, Revolver A 
is Jack’s most effective option, and Revolver B is his best option. If Jack takes Revolver 
A, he will be lucky enough to survive his stupidity. If he takes Revolver B, he will be 
unlucky enough not to survive his wisdom. He ought to take Revolver B, and that is what 
makes his situation tragic.  
As formulated, (MP) is perfectly impartial. The best option is what is most likely to 
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most effectively promote people’s ends, and no one’s ends receive any more weight than 
anyone else’s. Some philosophers believe that this sort of impartiality is definitive of 
ethical principles (Singer 1993). Others think ethics should allow us to be partial in 
weighting the ends we promote, perhaps by giving our own ends greater weight than 
others’ (Bennett 1978). For my purposes, it is unnecessary to take a side in this debate. If 
necessary, we could treat facts about whose ends an option promotes as possible 
overriders of the duty (MP) describes.  
Different moral theories are apt to explain why (MP) is true differently. A broadly 
Kantian theory, for example, would explain that helping to promote people’s ends is part 
of treating humanity as an end in itself (O’Neill 1986). Utilitarians are likely to point out 
that realizing their ends is what makes people happy, so we ought to do our best to bring 
about the realization of people’s ends.  
Despite its plausibility, one might object that (MP) attributes obligations that people 
do not in fact have.
7 
It might be that I could best promote people’s ends by getting rich 
and being generous. (MP) then seems to say that I have a moral obligation to get rich. Or 
maybe I would best promote people’s ends by giving up philosophy and becoming a 
doctor. (MP) would then seem to say that I am morally obliged to give up philosophy and 
become a doctor. But it is counterintuitive that I would be morally obligated to get rich or 
to become a doctor, and so (MP) looks false.  
The objection is plausible only if we treat (MP) as ascribing an overriding or all 
things considered moral obligation, rather than a pro tanto obligation. A person can have 
a pro tanto moral obligation even when further considerations override it. Although it is 
implausible that I have an all things considered moral obligation to get rich (if getting 
rich is one of my options), and it is implausible that I have an all things considered moral 
obligation to give up philosophy for medicine, (MP) does not entail that I have such 
obligations. It would entail those things only if we also assume that nothing is ever 
morally more important than promoting people’s ends (and doing so in a perfectly 
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impartial way). (MP) itself is neutral on that assumption, and I suspect it is false.  
Real counterexamples to (MP) would have to be cases in which a person does not 
even have a pro tanto obligation to take the best option. In these cases, no considerations 
would be morally relevant except the promotion of people’s ends, and yet it would not be 
true that a person ought to take the option that is most likely to be most effective. I know 
of no such cases.  
We can think of (MD) as a special case of (MP). When a person considers a 
proposition, her options are to believe it, to disbelieve it and to withhold judgment. I will 
argue that her best option is to take the favored attitude. Consequently, she has a pro tanto 
moral obligation to have the attitude her evidence favors.  
To see that the favored attitude is the best option, consider the ways in which our 
beliefs guide and constrain our actions in pursuit of our ends. We choose and execute our 
actions not on the basis of how the world is, but how we believe it to be. Nevertheless, it 
is how the world is that determines whether our plans succeed or fail. Thus it is important 
for our beliefs to give us an accurate picture of how things stand in the world.  
The importance of accurate beliefs is most evident when we face what Andy Clark 
has called “representation hungry” problems. These are problems that cannot be solved 
except by employing representations. Typical cases involve problems that require us to 
respond to absent, abstract or counterfactual states of affairs, or to respond to properties 
(such as monetary value) with no readily detectable physical manifestation (Clark and 
Toribio 1994; Clark 1997, 2001). To solve these problems we need accurate mental 
representations of information not available in our immediate environment. We need 
beliefs, but not just any old beliefs. We need accurate, relevant beliefs. Without them, we 
stand little chance of solving these problems except by blind luck.  
In representation hungry problems, it is not possible to check the accuracy of our 
beliefs by comparing them directly with what they represent. If we could, the problems 




That is why evidence is important. The attitudes one’s evidence favors are objectively 
most likely to be accurate, so they are objectively most likely to help one solve one’s 
representation hungry problems.  
Often, we face problems exhibiting what I call “higher order” representation hunger. 
To solve these problems, we must rely on other people’s solutions to representation 
hungry problems. In the simplest cases, one person faces a representation hungry problem 
and gets the required information from someone else. For example, I might need 
directions from you so that I can find the restaurant where we plan to meet for lunch. 
Other cases can be more complicated. If I plan to drive to the restaurant, I rely on the 
engineers who designed my car to have solved a host of representation hungry problems I 
know next to nothing about. Of course, our reliance on one another goes both ways. Not 
only do I depend on others, but others depend on me as a source of information, and they 
rely on me to have solved representation hungry problems as they pursue their ends.  
To achieve our ends, we need our attitudes to be accurate, we need other people’s 
attitudes to be accurate, and other people need our attitudes to be accurate. Thus we need 
ourselves and others to have the attitudes the evidence favors, and we have a pro tanto 
moral duty to take those attitudes. For example, suppose Frank is considering the 
proposition p. He might believe it, disbelieve it or withhold judgment. His evidence 
favors one of those attitudes. If he adopts the favored attitude, Frank puts himself into the 
best position to solve representation hungry problems to which p is relevant, and he will 
be a better source of information for others who face such problems. Thus, so long as p is 
relevant to people’s representation hungry problems, the favored attitude is Frank’s best 
option—his option that is most likely to do the most to promote people’s ends.  
But what if p is not relevant to any problems that anyone faces? There are still good 
reasons to think the favored attitude is Frank’s best option. First, it is still possible that p 
would be relevant to some problem sometime, and that is a possibility Frank cannot rule 
out. By taking the favored attitude, Frank is in a better position to promote people’s ends, 
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should p ever become relevant, than he would be otherwise. Frank ought to take the 
favored attitude for much the same reason that one should not run stop signs on dark 
country roads at 3:00 a.m. Even if no one else is around, they might be, and stopping is 
the safe thing to do. Similarly, even if p does not matter to anyone’s projects, it could, 
and it might someday, so the safest thing to do is to take the favored attitude.  
Second, it is plausible that Frank’s mere consideration of p makes p relevant to 
someone’s ends. For Frank to consider p is for him to consider whether p is true. In doing 
that, he necessarily adopts the ends of believing the truth about p and avoiding error as to 
p. At the very least, it best serves these ends of Frank’s for him to adopt the favored 
attitude. If p is relevant to no other ends, then Frank’s best option is take the attitude his 
evidence favors.  
Third, and perhaps most importantly, one generally manifests deeply rooted habits of 
mind in the formation of one’s doxastic attitudes. Those habits are not sensitive to any 
difference between propositions that are relevant to people’s projects and propositions 
that are not. We do not first decide whether a proposition matters and then select what 
habits of mind to apply in forming an attitude toward that proposition. We just deploy our 
habits. If Frank adopts an unfavored attitude toward an irrelevant proposition, he might 
be manifesting a habit of mind that would also lead him away from adopting the favored 
attitude toward propositions that do matter. Even if he is not manifesting such a habit, his 
adoption of an unfavored attitude contributes to the development one. Either way, Frank 
ought not to adopt the unfavored attitude. Even if p is not relevant to anyone’s projects, 
the manner in which Frank settles on his attitude is relevant, for he is apt to redeploy it. 
His best option, then, is to deploy habits of mind that lead to the attitudes his evidence 
favors.  
This point merits reiteration. To settle for an unfavored attitude towards an irrelevant 
proposition is either to manifest or to cultivate a habit that will lead to unfavored attitudes 
on relevant propositions. To manifest or cultivate such habits impedes one’s ability to 
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promote people’s ends—both one’s own and others’. Consequently, one ought not to do 
it.  
When a person considers a proposition, it is her pro tanto moral duty to adopt the 
attitude her evidence favors. That is the option that best promotes people’s ends. The 
guiding idea behind the notion of epistemic duty, however, is that having evidence that 
favors an attitude imposes a non-moral duty for one to do the very same thing. The posit 
of a purely epistemic type of duty, over and above one’s moral duties, is supposed to 
explain why people ought to respond to evidence by believing what it favors. But the 




This argument applies to Feldman and Chisholm’s conceptions of epistemic duty as 
well as to the core conception. Feldman thinks it is one’s epistemic duty to have the 
attitudes that constitute good performance as a believer. In Feldman’s view, though, those 
are just the attitudes one’s evidence favors. But we already have a pro tanto moral 
obligation to take the attitudes our evidence favors. If my evidence favors one attitude 
toward a proposition over the others, Feldman would say I ought to take that attitude 
because that is what being a good believer is all about. The notion of a “good believer,” 
however, is entirely unnecessary. If my evidence favors one attitude over the others, then 
taking that attitude is my best option with regard to promoting people’s ends. So, I have a 
pro tanto moral obligation to take that attitude, and there is no need to explain my duty in 
purely epistemic terms.  
Chisholm’s account of epistemic duty does not appeal directly to the notion of 
evidence. The account is plausible, however, only if what is epistemically required on 
that account coincides with what one’s evidence favors. So, if there is a pro tanto moral 
duty to have the attitudes one’s evidence favors, there is a pro tanto moral duty to have 
the attitudes Chisholm describes as epistemically required. On Chisholm’s understanding 
of epistemic requirements, then, there is no need to posit a special, nonmoral kind of duty 
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to explain why we ought to believe what our evidence favors. 
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5 Objections and Replies  
5.1 Objection 1: Diﬀerences in Moral and Epistemic Requirements  
If my argument so far has been correct, there is no point in talking about “epistemic” 
duties except as a species of moral duty. One might object that there are counterexamples 
to the claim that all supposedly epistemic duties are moral duties. We can expect any 
such counterexamples to be cases in which either (a) one is morally required to have an 
attitude one’s evidence does not favor, or (b) one is epistemically but not morally 
required to have an attitude toward a certain proposition.  
Consider the first kind of counterexample. It is hard to tell a plausible story that 
supports an intuitive judgment that someone morally ought to have an attitude her 
evidence does not support. I take the difficulty of telling such a story to count in favor of 
the view I am defending here. The most plausible cases, it seems, are cases in which we 
think there is great moral value in remaining loyal to someone and trusting that person, 
despite very powerful evidence that one’s trust is misplaced.  
Suppose, then, that Jack’s best friend has been arrested for a serious crime and insists 
that he is innocent. Jack has seen the evidence, though, and it is compelling. Some people 
might judge that Jack morally ought to believe his friend is innocent but epistemically 
ought to believe he is guilty.
11 
Does this sort of case not show that epistemic duty is one 
thing and moral duty quite another?  
It does not. Though we could interpret it as a case in which epistemic and moral re-
quirements pull in different directions, we could just as easily interpret it as highlighting 
the fact that our various pro tanto moral obligations sometimes pull us in different 
directions. This is a case in which one sort of pro tanto moral requirement (the 
 18
requirements of loyality) conflicts with another sort of pro tanto moral requirement (the 
requirement to have the attitudes one’s evidence favors). What Jack ought to do all things 
moral considered will depend on which is more important in this case: loyalty or 
conformity to one’s evidence. If we contrast what Jack epistemically ought to do with 
what he morally ought to do, we are really either contrasting one sort of moral 
consideration (the sort that depends on what evidence Jack has) with another (the sort that 
depends on loyalty), or we are contrasting Jack’s pro tanto, evidence-dependent moral 
duty with his moral duty all things considered.  
Cases like Jack’s are thus very similar to cases in which the requirements of justice 
and mercy conflict. Those cases do not show that either sort of requirement is non-moral, 
and cases like Jack’s do not show that supposedly epistemic requirements are non-moral 
either.  
In the second kind of supposed counterexample, one is epistemically but not morally 
required to have an attitude toward a certain proposition. The best candidates are cases in 
which it appears that a person has no moral duties at all, but has epistemic duties anyway. 
Alternatively, since the moral duty to follow your evidence derives from the moral duty 
to do what best promotes people’s ends, we could look for cases in which a person cannot 
do anything to promote people’s ends but has epistemic duties all the same.  
One might think people suffering from “locked in” syndrome represent such cases.
12 
These are people who are totally paralyzed and incapable of communicating with the 
outside world but remain conscious. We can even imagine unfortunate cases in which a 
person is not only locked in, but also “cut off”—incapable of sensory perception. Such a 
person would be completely alone with her thoughts, and it is easy to suppose she would 
not have any moral obligations.  
But imagine that Sue is locked in and cut off, and also considering Goldbach’s 
Conjecture. If she comes across a proof of the conjecture, is it not the case that she 
epistemically ought to believe it? And if she discovers a disproof, is it not the case that 
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she ought to disbelieve it? It appears that Sue has epistemic duties even though she has no 
moral duties. And so, it appears, epistemic duties are not moral duties after all.  
There are two responses to this line of objection. First, the objection turns on the 
claim that Sue has no moral obligations. Taken literally, the claim is obviously false. Sue 
does have some moral obligations. She ought not to murder anyone, for example, no 
matter how much she wants to. Lucky for her, no matter how much she wants to, she 
cannot murder anyone anyway. The fact that she could not murder anyone, however, is 
not enough to make murder permissible for her.  
The most charitable interpretation of the claim that Sue has no moral obligations is 
this: All things considered, all or almost all of Sue’s positive, other-directed, pro tanto 
moral obligations are overridden. Being locked in and cut off gives Sue a perfect excuse 
for not fulfilling those obligations. On that interpretation, however, note that the moral 
obligations do still exist. She has the obligations, but she also has a very good excuse for 
not fulfilling them. So, the claim that Sue has epistemic duties in her condition does not 
support the conclusion that epistemic duties are non-moral.  
Still, one might point out that Sue’s epistemic duties are not overridden when she is 
locked in and cut off, even though her other-directed pro tanto moral duties are 
overridden. That only means that epistemic duties are not other-directed pro tanto moral 
obligations, but I have not claimed that epistemic duties are other-directed at all. I have 
claimed that they derive from the moral obligation to promote people’s ends, not from a 
moral obligation to promote other people’s ends. So, exemption from other-directed 
moral obligations is not necessarily enough to provide exemption from epistemic moral 
obligations.  
This leads to a second line of response to the case of Sue. To consider a proposition is 
to consider whether it is true. So, if Sue is considering Goldbach’s Conjecture, she is 
considering whether Goldbach’s Conjecture is true. She is adopting the ends of believing 
the truth and avoiding error on the Conjecture. Believing in accord with her evidence is 
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her best option with regard to her ends, and her ends are the only ends she is in any 
position to promote. So, even if it makes no difference to anyone else’s ends what Sue 




Some people might prefer to reserve ‘moral’ to describe one’s duties to promote 
others’ ends, rather than one’s duties to promote ends as such, including one’s own. Sue’s 
duty in this case would then not qualify as moral, because it has nothing to do with 
promoting others’ ends. Though I think it is inadvisable to identify morality with 
altruism, it appears to be a merely verbal question whether moral duties are duties to 
promote ends as such or duties to promote others’ ends. If we opt for the more restrictive 
notion of which duties to call “moral,” it does not affect the argument I have been 
making. Being locked in and cut off, Sue ought to do whatever best promotes her ends. 
That means she ought to adopt the attitudes her evidence favors. There is no need to posit 
an additional, purely epistemic source of duty to explain why Sue ought to have the 
attitudes she ought to have.  
Still, one might stipulate a case of Sue*, who is locked in and cut off and does not 
care about believing what is true. Some people will maintain that even Sue* ought to 
have just the attitudes her evidence favors. I am not one of them. If she does not care 
about truth, then it makes no difference to anyone, including Sue*, whether she has the 
attitudes her evidence favors. But if it makes no difference to anyone whether she has 
those attitudes, I cannot see any reason to insist that she ought to have them anyway. 




5.2 Objection 2: “Epistemology is Prior to Ethics”  
An act’s moral status often depends on what one would be epistemically justified in 
believing. Suppose I think you are a deranged killer. If my belief is epistemically 
 21
justified, then it might be morally permissible (or even obligatory) for me to confine you 
against your will and summon the police. If my belief is not epistemically justified, 
though, such an action would probably be immoral. The morality of my action depends 
partly on the epistemic justification of my beliefs about the situation in which I act.  
Also, according to a plausible version of consequentialism, an act’s actual 
consequences do not determine its moral status. Instead, an act’s moral status depends on 
what the agent was epistemically justified in believing its consequences would be. Thus, 
an act with bad actual consequences can be morally in the clear when the agent was 
justified in expecting good consequences, and an act with good consequences can be 
morally wrong if the agent was justified in expecting bad consequences (Fumerton 2001).  
Epistemic justification thus appears to make a difference to morality. That might 
make it seem that epistemic duty cannot be a special case of moral duty. Instead, 
epistemic duty might appear to be prior to and independent of moral duty. It would be a 
mistake to draw that conclusion, however.  
If an act’s morality can depend on what the agent is justified in believing, we should 
ask why that is so. There are at least two initially plausible explanations. One is that 
epistemic duty is indeed independent of and prior to moral duty. In that case, the very 
idea of moral duty would depend on the idea of epistemic duty, and moral duties would 
arise only from within the preexisting context of one’s epistemic duties. The moral 
relevance of epistemic justification derives from the fact that one has a prior duty to have 
epistemically justified beliefs, and the substance of one’s moral duties is fixed only on 
the assumption one has discharged the prior, non-moral, epistemic duties. We might say 
that it makes no sense to ask what one morally ought to do until it is settled what one 
epistemically ought to believe. 
15 
 
That is not the only possible explanation. A second possibility begins with the obser-
vation that we must always act on the information we have; no one can act on 
information she lacks. So, we do not usually hold agents morally responsible to the actual 
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facts of their situations, but to how things probably would have been, given the available 
information. The morality of what I do, then, is often a function of how things would 
probably be, given the information I have or could reasonably be expected to acquire. 
Morality’s dependence on how things probably would be, given my information, 
manifests itself as dependence on what I would be epistemically justified in believing. 
After all, the beliefs I would be justified in holding are those that would probably be true, 
given the information available to me. It is probable truth, not epistemic justification, that 
explains the relevance of these beliefs to morality.  
We can summarize these two possibilities as follows. The first is the possibility that 
epistemic justification matters to morality because our beliefs non-morally ought to be 
justified. The second is the possibility that epistemic justification matters to morality 
because of its connection to truth.  
I find the second explanation preferable on the grounds of economy and power. It is 
more economical because it requires us to posit no new, unexplained kinds of duty. It is 
more powerful because it explains not only why epistemically justified beliefs (rather 
than facts or epistemically unjustified beliefs) matter to the morality of actions, but also 
the sense in which we “ought” to have justified beliefs: The morality of our actions 
depends on what is probably so, given our information, and hence on the justification of 
our beliefs. To act morally then, we need justified beliefs; lacking them or having 
epistemically unjustified beliefs would impede one’s ability to do what is morally right.  
Even apart from these explanatory considerations, there is a further problem with the 
inference from ‘epistemic justification is relevant to morality’ to ‘epistemic duty is prior 
to moral duty’. We can morally evaluate not only actions, but their outcomes and their 
agents in so acting. It is perfectly sensible to call an act morally better or worse 
depending on the moral worth of its outcome, regardless of the agent’s epistemic 
situation. The epistemic situation of the agent is relevant not to the evaluation of her 
actions but to the evaluation of her in so acting. But we evaluate agents along a variety of 
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moral dimensions. One dimension pertains to actual consequences: An agent is right or 
wrong in acting as she does accordingly as the actual consequences of her actions are 
good or bad. A second sense takes the agent’s doxastic situation into account: She is right 
or wrong in acting as she does accordingly as she believes the consequences would be 
good or bad, regardless of the actual consequences. A third dimension takes her conative 
situation into account: An agent acts rightly or wrongly accordingly as she intends her 
action to have good or bad consequences. Yet a fourth dimension takes her epistemic 
situation into account: She acts rightly or wrongly accordingly as she would be justified 
in thinking her actions would have good or bad consequences.  
The fact that an agent’s epistemic situation is relevant to one sort of moral appraisal 
of her is far from enough to show that epistemic duty is prior to moral duty. In general, 
lots of things that are not conceptually prior to morality can be relevant to moral 
appraisals. In the biblical story of the widow’s mites (Mark 12:41-44; Luke 21:14), a 
person’s economic situation is taken to be relevant to a moral appraisal of her in acting as 
she does. That is no indication that poverty is conceptually prior to morality. The 
relevance of epistemic justification to moral appraisals shows only that we sometimes 
take a person’s epistemic situation into account when we make moral appraisals of her. It 
does not show that the concept of epistemic duty is prior to that of moral duty. 
5.3 Objection 3: The Constitutive Normativity of Belief  
Many philosophers have claimed that the concept of belief is “normative” (Davidson 
1984; Kim 2000; McDowell 1994; Brandom 1994). By this they mean that part of what it 
is to be a believer is to be bound by the rules specifying the conditions of rational belief. 
The basic idea is that we cannot attribute beliefs to things without assuming that the 
beliefs we attribute tend to conform to the standards of epistemic justification and the 
correct use of evidence. This, according to Jaegwon Kim (for example), entails that 
 24
“belief attribution requires belief evaluation” (2000, p. 307). Nothing can have the status 
of “believer” unless it also has the duty to believe in proper accord with its evidence.  
This line of thought suggests an objection to my claim that, if we can always 
redescribe putative epistemic duties as moral duties, there is no need to posit an 
independent realm of purely epistemic duty. The duty to believe in proper accord with 
one’s evidence is partly constitutive of having beliefs at all; nothing can have beliefs 
without having such duties. Now, one might go on, it is only contingently true that we 
face representation hungry problems and rely on one another’s beliefs. Even if we did not 
rely on one another or face such problems, however, we would still be believers, and we 
would still have epistemic duties. We need to posit epistemic duties, then, to explain why 
it is necessary that anything with beliefs ought use its evidence in certain ways and ought 
not to use it in others. 
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To see why this objection fails, consider the following example of a statement about 
putatively epistemic duties:  
MT If (a) S believes that Not-q, (b) S believes that q if p, and (c) S lacks evidence that p 
that outweighs S’s evidence that Not-q, then S ought to believe that Not-p.  
According to the view I have been defending, MT attributes a pro tanto moral duty if it 
attributes any duty at all. According to the view that the concept of belief is normative, 
there is another sense in which MT, if true, attributes a duty. It describes a duty that binds 
any creature that has beliefs, necessarily, merely in virtue of the fact that it has beliefs. A 
possible believer who, unlike us, is not part of a community whose members are 
cognitively dependent on one another, still ought to do what the consequent says to do if 
it satisfies the antecedent. If that were not so, on this view, the creature just would not 
count as having beliefs at all.  
For argument’s sake, I am willing to grant that there is a sense in which any 
believer—in virtue of being a believer alone and independently of moral 
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considerations—ought to believe that Not-p if it satisfies conditions (a), (b), and (c) 
above. The relevant sense of ‘ought’, however, does not express the attribution of a duty. 
MT uses ‘ought’ to describe what a non-malfunctioning believer will do, or to describe 
paradigmatic behavior of a believer, or to describe (part of) the so-called “proper 
functioning” of a belief-forming mechanism. It is the same sense of ‘ought’ in which we 
might say:  
T If (a) the thermostat is set to 75 degrees, and (b) the temperature is 70 degrees, then 
the thermostat ought to activate the heater.  
When a thermostat violates T, we are apt to say that it is malfunctioning. If something 
routinely enough violates T and similar principles, we are apt to say that it is no 
thermostat at all. But under no circumstances would we say that T describes the duty of a 
thermostat. Similarly, if a believer violates MT, she has done what she ought not in the 
sense of failing to do something that is partly constitutive of being a believer. She has 
“malfunctioned” as a believer. And if she routinely enough violates MT and similar 
principles, we are apt to say that she is no believer at all.  
We need not see principles such as MT, then, as attributing duties. They just describe 
the kind of cognitive behavior that is involved in having beliefs. But there is no reason to 
suppose that such behavior is obligatory for believers unless we also assume that it is the 
duty of thermostats to activate heaters in certain circumstances.  
The objection from the constitutive normativity of belief thus fails. The sense in 
which believers qua believers ought to believe in certain ways is just the sense in which 
thermostats qua thermostats ought to function in certain ways. It is not a sense of ‘ought’ 
that expresses duty. To read the ‘ought’ of a principle such as MT as an ascription of 
duty, we need to take into account more than just the fact that believers are believers. 
According to the view I am suggesting, we need to take into account that believers are 
moral agents mutually cognitively dependent on other moral agents.  
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6 Conclusion  
In “The Ethics of Belief,” W. K. Clifford expresses a view similar to my own. He writes:  
And no one man’s belief is in any case a private matter which concerns 
himself alone. Our lives are guided by that general conception of the course 
of things which has been created by society for social purposes. Our words, 
our phrases, our forms and processes and modes of thought, are common 
property, fashioned and perfected from age to age; an heirloom which every 
succeeding generation inherits as a precious deposit and a sacred trust to be 
handed on to the next one, not unchanged but enlarged and purified, with 
some clear marks of its proper handiwork. Into this, for good or ill, is woven 
every belief of every man who has speech of his fellows. An awful privilege, 
and an awful responsibility, that we should help to create the world in which 
posterity will live. (Clifford 1876/1999,  
p. 73)  
Clifford probably has an exaggerated view of the importance of all of everyone’s 
beliefs to the whole of posterity. Nevertheless, I think he has his finger on a very 
important point about human life: We guide our lives by what we believe, and we rely on 
ourselves and one another to have properly justified beliefs as we do so. That, in my view 
and perhaps Clifford’s, is the source of a moral obligation to have justified beliefs. The 
existence of such an obligation, it so happens, screens out the need to posit an 
independent realm of purely epistemic duty. Unless we recognize them as a special case 





Alston thinks the analysis of epistemic justification in terms of duty is natural, but he does not endorse 
it.  
2
This is actually Chisholm’s definition of purely doxastic requirement, and he defines epistemic 
requirement as a species of purely doxastic requirement. I have not been able to see how any purely 
doxastic requirement could fail to be epistemic on Chisholm’s view, and so I employ the simpler definition 
here.  
3
Feldman borrows this distinction from Wolterstorff (1997).  
4
There is room to challenge the idea that we cannot understand the idea of evidence apart from the idea 
of epistemic duty. For example, Timothy Williamson (2000) argues that one’s evidence is one’s 
knowledge, and his account of knowledge does not turn on the idea of epistemic duty.  
5
Moral badness does not imply moral wrongness. If all one’s options are morally bad, it is not morally 
wrong to take the least bad option.  
6
Here is one way to make this characterization more precise. Let E be a set of ends, {e1, e2, …, en}. The 
effectiveness of an option O relative to E is ∑
i 
Pr(ei | O) - Pr(ei | ~O), where Pr(en | O) is the objective 
probability that en will be realized conditional on one’s taking the option O, and Pr(en | ~O) is the 
probability en will be realized conditional on one’s not taking O. Other ways of making the characterization 
precise might take into account the relative importance of the ends in E or modify the way O’s influence on 
an end’s probability is measured. 
7
I thank an anonymous referee for stressing the importance of this objection.  
8
Unless some form of direct realism is true, we can never directly compare our beliefs with the world.  
9
None of this implies a moral requirement to have attitudes that are true. Suppose Frank considers the 
proposition p. I have assumed that Frank’s most effective option is to believe whichever is true, p or Not-p. 
His best option is the one that is most likely to be most effective, given the information available to him. It 
is whatever attitude his evidence favors. Frank’s pro tanto moral duty is to take the best option, not the 
most effective one. So, his pro tanto moral duty is have the attitude his evidence favors, which is usually 
but not always the true attitude.  
10
I should note that Chisholm never claims that epistemic duties are non-moral. In his view, a duty is 
moral if no further considerations override it; moral duties are duties all things considered. Indeed, 
Chisholm takes it as primitive that some states impose what he calls epistemic requirements, and he does 
not pursue the question of how those requirements come about. It could turn out that the view I am offering 
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is ultimately compatible with Chisholm’s.  
11
Not everyone has this intuition. I do not have it. Some people do, though. George W. Bush’s tendency 
to stick by his friends even in the face of evidence of their misdeeds (e.g., Rafael Palmeiro’s steroid use) is 
sometimes lauded as a manifestation of good moral character.  
12
I thank an anonymous referee for mentioning these cases to me.  
13
This is why it is false in Sue’s case that there is nothing she can do to promote people’s ends. She may 
be unable to promote other people’s ends, but that does not mean she cannot promote anyone’s ends at all.  
14
It might turn out that Sue* ought to care about truth, and so she ought to follow her evidence for that 
reason. The relevant question would then be, “Why ought Sue* to care about truth?” There are only four 
plausible answers. (1) Truth is intrinsically valuable. (2) Caring about truth is intrinsically valuable. (3) 
Truth is useful. And (4) caring about truth is useful. (1) and (2) seem to provide moral reasons to care about 
truth, and (3) and (4) give practical reasons. Thus, if Sue* ought to follow her evidence because she ought 
to care about truth, the relevant sense of ‘ought’ remains moral or practical, not purely epistemic.  
15
Richard Fumerton argues from the claim that epistemic justification is relevant to morality to the claim 
that the epistemic ‘ought’ is prior to the moral ‘ought’ (better, the moral ‘ought to do’). He does not argue, 
though, that epistemic duty is prior to moral duty. Fumerton takes the priority of the epistemic ‘ought’ as 
evidence that it is a non-normative ought. A non-normative ‘ought’, whatever else it might be, is an ‘ought’ 
that does not attribute duties, so I do not think there is substantive disagreement between Fumerton and 
myself.  
16
It may be that Feldman has these sorts of considerations in mind when he contends that our epistemic 
duties are what we ought to do if we are to do the job of being a believer “correctly.” Jonathan Adler also 
argues that the idea of epistemic duty is intrinsic to the idea of belief, but for non-Davidsonian reasons 
(Adler 2002).  
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